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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
JON CURTIS MAY,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________ )

NO. 43970
MINIDOKA COUNTY
NO. CR 2015-2070
APPELLANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jon Curtis May asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review his case. He asserts
the Court of Appeals erred in holding an investigatory detention is permissible if it is
based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is
absconding parole. See State v. May, 2016 Opinion No. 798 (Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2016)
(hereinafter “Opinion”), p.4. Absconding parole is not a crime, and suspicion that a
detained person is absconding parole cannot justify an investigatory detention.
Because the officer who attempted to either arrest Mr. May or detain him for purposes
of an investigatory detention did so absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,
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Mr. May’s act of fleeing from the officer did not provide the requisite justification for
Mr. May’s subsequent arrest and search incident thereto.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. May knocked on the front door of a residence while two officers were
conducting a search inside in connection with a woman on misdemeanor probation.
(10/19/15 Tr., p.11, L.8 – p.12, L.4.) The officer who answered the door recognized
Mr. May and believed Mr. May had absconded from parole, though a written agent’s
warrant had not been issued. (10/19/15 Tr., p.10, L.25 – p.11, L.5; p.12, Ls.11-13;
R., p.70.) The officer asked Mr. May to turn around and put his hands behind his back.
(10/19/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.11-13.) The officer then “grabbed a hold of [Mr. May’s] hands”
and Mr. May “took off running.” (10/19/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.15-18.) The officer yelled at
Mr. May to stop, ran after him, and then “placed him on the ground” in the street.
(10/19/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.19-25.) The officer found a bottle of pills in Mr. May’s pocket.
(10/19/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.1-8.)
Mr. May was charged by Information with two counts of possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to deliver and one count of resisting and/or
obstructing an officer. (R., pp.34-37.) The State also alleged he was a persistent
violator within the meaning of Idaho Code § 19-2514. (R., pp.38-41.) Mr. May filed a
motion to suppress, which the district court denied. (R., pp.30-31, 68-72.) The district
court concluded Mr. May’s arrest did not comply with Idaho Code § 20-227.1 (R., p.70.)
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Idaho Code § 20-227(1) states in pertinent part: “Any parole or probation officer may
arrest a parolee . . . without a warrant, or may deputize any other officer with power of
arrest to do so, by giving such officer a written statement hereafter referred to as an
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However, the district court concluded Mr. May was not entitled to suppression because
the statutory violation did not violate Mr. May’s constitutional rights. (R., pp.70-71.) Mr.
May then pled guilty to an amended charge of possession of a controlled substance,
reserving his right to appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.74, 7778, 82-83.) The district court sentenced Mr. May to a unified term of five years, with
eighteen months fixed. (2/1/16 Tr., p.11, L.17 – p.12, L. 6; p.13, Ls. 19-22; R., p.93.)
On appeal, Mr. May did not contest the district court’s conclusion that
suppression is not the appropriate remedy for a violation of Idaho Code § 20-227, but
argued instead the district court erred in failing to suppress the evidence found on his
person because he was seized and searched in violation of the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. (App. Br., pp.6-9.) Mr. May argued the State did not
meet its burden of establishing that an exception to the warrant requirement applied, or
that his search and seizure was otherwise reasonable.
In its brief, the State first argued Mr. May “failed to preserve for appellate review
a standalone claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were waived.” (Resp. Br., pp.4-6.)
The State next argued if the issue was preserved, the search of Mr. May was valid
either because he waived his Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of his probation
or pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.
(Resp. Br., pp.6-12.) The State argued, among other things, that Mr. May’s detention
was lawful because the officer could detain him on reasonable suspicion that he had
violated parole by absconding. (Resp. Br., p.10.) The State did not cite any authority
for the proposition that reasonable suspicion of absconding parole constitutes
agent’s warrant, setting forth that the parolee . . . has, in the judgment of said parole or
probation officer, violated the conditions of . . . his parole . . . .”
3

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to support an investigatory detention.
(Resp. Br., p.10.)
The case was originally set for oral argument, but the Court of Appeals vacated
the argument and issued the Opinion. In the Opinion, the Court first affirmed the district
court’s holding that a violation of Idaho Code § 20-227 does not warrant suppression.
(Opinion, p.3.)

The Court then considered Mr. May’s Fourth Amendment claim,

concluding the claim was preserved because it “was apparent from the context of the
suppression hearing.” (Opinion, p.4.) The Court reviewed the facts and stated that,
when he encountered Mr. May at the door, the officer may have had probable cause to
arrest Mr. May for violating parole, but “[e]ven assuming arguendo the officer’s
knowledge was insufficient to establish probable cause, it was at least sufficient to
detain May.”

(Opinion, p.4.)

The Court explained “[a]n investigative detention is

permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the
detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” (Opinion,
p.4 (citation omitted).) The Court stated “the parole officer’s tip alone was sufficient to
establish the necessary suspicion to detain May to determine whether he had violated
his parole [by absconding].” (Opinion, p.4 (citation omitted).) The Court then held
Mr. May committed the crime of resisting or obstructing when he fled from the officer,
which provided the officer with probable cause to arrest Mr. May for violating Idaho
Code § 18-705. (Opinion, p.5.)
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ISSUE
Did the Court of Appeals decide a question of substance probably not in accord with
applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court,
when it held an investigatory detention is permissible if it is based upon specific
articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is absconding parole?
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ARGUMENT
In Holding An Investigatory Detention Is Permissible If It Is Based Upon Specific
Articulable Facts Which Justify Suspicion That The Detained Person Is Absconding
Parole, The Court Of Appeals Decided A Question Of Substance Probably Not In
Accord With Applicable Decisions Of The Idaho Supreme Court And The United States
Supreme Court Because Absconding Parole Is Not In And Of Itself A Crime
An investigatory detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable
facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be
engaged in criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see also State v.
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983 (Ct. App. 2003).

“The information available to the

detaining officer must show a ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983 (quoting
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). Parole is governed by a written
agreement. See I.C. § 20-228 (stating “[t]he commission for pardons and parole, in
releasing a person on parole, shall specify in writing the conditions of parole”).
Absconding from parole would surely violate the written parole agreement, but that does
not make it, in and of itself, a crime. It appears the Court of Appeals has held for the
first time in Idaho that an investigatory detention may be based upon specific articulable
facts which justify suspicion only that the detained person is absconding parole.
In this case, Mr. May fled from the officer after the officer attempted to either
arrest him or detain him at the door. At the time, the officer lacked probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. May was, had been, or was about to be engaged in
criminal activity; the officer suspected only that Mr. May had absconded from parole.
Fleeing from an officer is only a crime under Idaho Code § 18-705 if the officer is
discharging or attempting to discharge a lawful and authorized act of a public officer.
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See State v. Wiedenheft, 136 Idaho 14, 16, (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v.
Wilkerson, 114 Idaho 174, 180 (Ct. App. 1988) (defining the word “duty” as used in
§ 18-705 to “encompass only those lawful and authorized acts of a public officer”).
Where a person refuses to obey an order or obstructs an act of a public officer which is
not permitted under statutory or constitutional law, the person does not violate § 18-705.
See Wiedenheft, 136 Idaho at 16; see also Wilkerson, 114 Idaho at 180.
Here, the officer’s detention of Mr. May was not permitted under statutory or
constitutional law because no written agent’s warrant had been issued for Mr. May’s
arrest and the officer lacked either probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.

Mr. May’s act of fleeing from the officer did not violate § 18-705 and his

subsequent seizure and search violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the district court’s denial of Mr. May’s motion to
suppress.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Mr. May respectfully requests that the Idaho
Supreme Court grant his Petition for Review and consider the merits of the issue he
raised on appeal. Mr. May requests that the Court vacate his conviction, reverse the
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district
court for further proceedings.
DATED this 12th day of January, 2017
__________/S/_______________________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12th day of January, 2017, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REVIEW, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
JON CURTIS MAY
INMATE #86806
ISCI
PO BOX 14
BOISE ID 83707
MICHAEL R CRABTREE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED
CLAYNE S ZOLLINGER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED

____/S/_____________________
MAGALI CEJA
Administrative Assistant
AWR/mc

8

